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In a typical book review, I would look for and examine what is new about a particular thinker’s idea or presentation. However, as I read The Cambridge Companion
to Dewey I find that I cannot and should not use the same criteria for evaluation.
I pick up a Cambridge Companion when I need an introduction or a refresher on
material—not when I need to see what the cutting-edge scholarship is. That being
said, a companion ought not propagate the status quo or fail to communicate what
is current in the understanding of a figure or an area. Therefore, a companion
ought, first, to provide an adequate introduction to a literate, but inexpert, person
to the field it purports to introduce. Second, a companion should show the diversity of thought about a subject—what are the controversies and various thoughts
about a figure that one might encounter. I do not expect every heterodox reading of
a figure, but I would desire to know various understandings of that figure. Finally,
a companion should impart the tools to start independent research on the figure
in question. With this in mind, I turn to The Cambridge Companion to Dewey.
Robert Westbrook’s biographical chapter is accessible and informative. His
discussion of the role of Dewey’s first wife Alice and his political awareness in Chicago is instructive on how deeply democratic social life informs Dewey’s thought.
Ruth Anna Putnam’s contribution to the volume is laudatory. While using
the general language of contemporary philosophy, she dissolves many of the problems analytic philosophers might have in interpreting Dewey’s language. It is also
noteworthy that Putnam acknowledges Dewey’s similarities and indebtedness to
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Peirce in regard to the theory of truth—the agreement of all possible inquirers after
all possible inquiry. Putnam, further, does an admirable job of showing how Dewey
does not fall into the opposing schools of realism or antirealism, instead presenting
Dewey’s philosophy of experience. Dewey’s theory of inquiry is not simply another
epistemological category but a unifying activity that brings together all parts of inquisitive activity—including ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology.
Richard M. Gale provides a highly critical chapter suggesting that Dewey’s
naturalism is a distinctly humanistic variety of naturalism that seeks to set up a
near-Hegelian, completely continuous metaphysical monism in which the organism
and environment collapse together. Gale suggests this is a version of claiming that
naturalism of Dewey’s sort “depict[s] nature as made for us human beings because
it answers back to our deepest feelings and aspirations” (55). Gale understands
Dewey’s naturalism to hold that all of nature is continuous and that our interaction with it as organisms is wholly aesthetic with cognition as an immanent quality
(even accusing Dewey of scholasticism by claiming that Dewey holds that inquiry is
immanent in all matter because an effect cannot have more reality than its cause).
Isaac Levi also contributes a critical chapter on Dewey’s theory of inquiry. Levi
presents Dewey’s theory of inquiry against Peirce’s theory of fixing belief—pointing
out that Peirce’s theory allows for the fixation of belief in irrational, but all too human, manners that have more explanatory power. Levi’s concern is that doubt can
be settled by means other than inquiry. This criticism of Deweyan inquiry arises
from Dewey’s commitment that all problematic situations ought to be brought to
determinacy by inquiry. This would imply, on Levi’s reading, that whenever a belief is formed the inquirer should play that belief out to all its logical consequences
(88). Levi’s overall point is that there are, when we investigate the problems of life
as opposed to the problems of philosophers, many (often successful) means of fi xing belief. Further, Levi suggests a reconstruction of Dewey’s thought where we
understand belief as commitment to a point of view.
J. E. Tiles argues that Dewey’s philosophy takes James’s radical empiricism as
a starting point and expands his philosophy of experience to include not only the
possibility of experience as an interaction of organism and environment, but also
recognizes that experience occurs consciously and subconsciously (102-03). Tiles
adequately and clearly presents Dewey’s position that logic is the study of inquiry
and that inquiry is always empirical.
Mark Johnson seeks to show that Dewey’s philosophy is a nonreductive naturalistic philosophy of mind that accords with contemporary neuroscience. Johnson
argues that Dewey’s breakdown of the mind/body dualism agrees with contemporary neuroscience (127) and provides a meaningful and important manner in
which to talk about mind as an achievement of embodied inquirers (126). Johnson
rightly states, “mind emerges when symbolic interaction and sharing of meanings becomes possible for a group of creatures” (128). While Johnson shows how
an organism in an environment functionalizes “mind,” he is careful to do so in a
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nonreductive manner. Johnson argues that situations are always “saturated with
feeling, meaning, and interest” (133) and demonstrates the import of Dewey to
contemporary neuroscience.
Matthias Jung argues that the work of Dewey can help to illuminate obscurity
between the dichotomous camps of rationalist action theorists who seek to describe
how thought effects activity and those empiricists who seek to show how activity can
take place in a situation. Both these camps leave out important factors of activity.
Jung writes: “Emphasizing the importance of situation, corporeality, and sociality,
against . . . tacit assumptions of both normative and rational choice theories of action, the pragmatists, especially John Dewey, offer an alternative” (147). Jung sees
Dewey’s rejection of the reflex arc as a legitimate description of activity and applauds Dewey’s a theory of embodiment (154). The essay concludes by describing the
benefits of Dewey’s theory of mind for cognitive science and artificial intelligence.
Jennifer Welchman’s contribution to the volume is a valuable introduction to
the often cryptic and confusing world of pragmatic ethics. Dewey rejects universal
or rational principles and introduces a socially embedded, practical, and situational
ethics. Understanding that “all practical judgment is functional or instrumental,”
Welchman argues that there is a difference between what is valued and what is a
warranted valuation (172). While values are what is simply prized or desired, valuations are those values that are judged as important in a moral situation. Importantly,
Welchman emphasizes the inherently and unavoidably social aspects of ethical
deliberation (176) and the pluralistic moral factors involved in moral deliberation
(179). She cites the pluralistic moral philosophy of “Three Independent Factors in
Morals” and concludes that the moral life is not guided by any one principle but is
rather a form of “pluralistic welfare consequentialism” (182).
In a very helpful contribution to this volume, James Bohman argues that “the
purpose of Dewey’s naturalistic ethics is not merely descriptive, but ameliorative:
he seeks to improve moral judgments and make them suitable to . . . new social
circumstances” (187). Dewey’s moral theorizing lacks a focus on rendering activity consistent with some a priori or dogmatic norm but instead seeks to improve
the meaning of lived situations. Especially helpful is Bohman’s exposition of moral
inquiry as a dynamic change of habits. Bohman is careful to avoid an individualist
or collectivist account of how habits are developed in a social milieu. Bohman sees
Dewey’s “contextualism as a solution to a number of skeptical difficulties of moral
philosophy,” understanding moral problems as practical, not theoretical, problems
(199). Dewey’s work is thus rendered an important tool for changing concrete problematic situations.
Sami Pihlström presents Dewey’s mature religious thought in A Common
Faith. Dewey’s religious philosophy argues that there is a religious experience without making dogmatic or empirically unfounded claims which are forwarded by
various individual religions. Dewey’s insight that “the religious aspect of experience
can be appreciated without metaphysical commitments of anything supernatural”
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(211) is strengthened by Pihlström’s careful consideration of Dewey’s nonreductive
naturalism, his commitment to an ethics of growth, and his straddling of realism
and antirealism. Pihlström argues that “Dewey’s pragmatic ‘instrumentalism’ . .
. accommodates an intriguing tension between standard realisms and antirealisms” (221). Dewey’s constructivism maintains “that objects are not independent
of inquiry but pragmatically constructions arising out of an intelligent use of the
methods of inquiry” (223). Thus Dewey is a realist (of a sort) insofar as he rejects
“unnatural doubts about the reality of theoretical entities” and accepts “whatever the
religiously inclined ‘inquirer’ finds necessary to postulate within her/his genuinely
religious experience” (224). Pihlström concludes his essay with some informative
work on how Dewey compares to his various contemporary religious naturalists.
Richard Eldridge contributes a chapter on Dewey’s philosophy of art, discussing contributions of this philosophy to Dewey’s overall project. Eldridge, citing
Art as Experience, outlines the various arguments Dewey gives to explain that aesthetic experience leads to a philosophy of “organic interrelatedness” (246). Eldridge
concludes his chapter by noting the criticisms of Dewey’s overall project but also
holds that “if we are to have any chance of living and meaning fully, intensely, and
more adequately than we now do, then we shall have to imagine better modalities
of life constructively” (260). Eldridge argues that Dewey’s thought contributes to
the imaginative manners that we can employ to construct our realities—and art
is one good way to give “material embodiment to initiator-provoked, imaginative
visions of human possibility” (261).
Nel Noddings provides what she calls an “appreciative critique” of Dewey’s
theory of education from the perspective of care ethics (265). Noddings finds that
“care theory is largely compatible with Dewey’s philosophy of education” (285).
Her criticisms of Dewey focus mostly on omissions in Dewey’s work on education
or on topics where Dewey does not take his observation that education should be
about experience deeply enough to incorporate the experience of women and those
who find themselves forced to do mundane and often repetitive work. Noddings
holds that care ethics provides an adequate expansion on what she understands
to be omissions in Dewey’s philosophy. By focusing on the dyadic relationship of
cared-for and care-giver, Noddings hold that many of Dewey’s omissions and vague
points can be corrected. Noddings raises fair points about some of Dewey’s explicit
omissions and her “appreciative criticism” will only, I believe, increase the broad
applicability of pragmatic philosophy.
Richard J. Bernstein contributes a helpful chapter on Dewey’s democratic
faith. Arguing that Dewey did not believe democracy to be simply a form of government where atomic individuals come together into a mass which becomes the
sovereign majority. Instead, Bernstein rightly argues, Dewey’s democratic faith is
placed in a social ethos that recognizes that rich social ties and interactions constitute the dynamic creation of majorities. This vision of democracy has room for
legitimate experts and does not fall into the mob rule of the demos. Bernstein conVolume 27 (2)  2011
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tinually emphasizes that Dewey’s democratic theory is a social theory. Further, this
contribution to the volume discusses the complex relationship Dewey has to communitarians on one side and liberals on the other.
In the final chapter of this volume, Molly Cochran argues that Dewey’s work
has contemporary influence in the field of international relations. While discussing
Dewey’s shifting views on war, the outlawing of war, and international governance,
Cochran argues that Dewey’s vision of democracy, publics, and rejection of the
Westphalian conception of states is important for contemporary studies of international relations. Dewey thus foreshadows the shift to normative approaches in
international relations. Cochran concludes that Dewey’s emphasis on the humanity
of individuals and faith in the potential of education to form democratic publics is
significant for contemporary discussions.
Overall, this volume satisfies the goals of the Cambridge Companion series.
However the volume lacks a thoroughgoing discussion of Dewey’s philosophy of
education—Noddings’ essay is good, but not sufficient for an explication of Dewey’s role in progressive education and continuing influence in educational theory. I
would also like to see more essays on Dewey’s democratic theory, philosophy of art,
and philosophy of technology. However, despite these omissions, the volume will
satisfy many readers. Those new to Dewey’s work will find several significant starting points where their own research into Dewey can begin and seasoned scholars
will find the essays from well regarded philosophers helpful in their own projects.
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